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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1854 and 1855 the United States entered into a series of
treaties with the Western Washington Indians to insure peace
and prosperity for the growing population of settlers.' The
Indians exchanged vast tracts of land2 for monetary payments3
and other minimal guarantees4 while reserving certain smaller
parcels for their exclusive use. 5 In each treaty, the signatory
1. Treaty of Medicine Creek, Dec. 26, 1854, 10 Stat. 1132 (1855) (the signatory
tribes included the Muckleshoot, Nisqually, and Squaxim); Treaty of Olympia, July 1,
1855, Jan. 25, 1856, 12 Stat. 971 (1859) (the signatory tribes included the Hoh, Quileute,
and Quinault); Treaty of Neah Bay, Jan. 31, 1855, 12 Stat. 939 (1859) (signed by the
Makah Tribe); Treaty of Point Elliot, Jan. 22, 1855, 12 Stat. 927 (1859) (the signatory
tribes included the Lummi, Muckleshoot, Upper Skagit, Duwamish, and Suquamish);
Treaty with the Yakimas, June 9, 1855, 12 Stat. 951 (1859) (signed by the Yakima
Nation); Treaty of Point no Point, Jan. 26, 1855, 12 Stat. 933 (1859) (signed by the
Skokomish Tribe). Although the parties negotiated and signed the treaties in 1854 and
1855, Congress refused to ratify any but the Treaty of Medicine Creek prior to 1859 due
to continuing hostilities between the settlers and certain tribes. AMERICAN FRIENDS
SERVICES COMMITTEE, UNCOMMON CONTROVERSY: FISHING RIGHTS OF THE MUCKLESHOOT,
PUYALLUP, AND NISQUALLY INDIANS 36 (1970) [hereinafter cited as UNCOMMON
CONTROVERSY].
2. E.g., Treaty of Medicine Creek art. II, Dec. 26, 1854, 10 Stat. 1132 (1855). The
ceded land included the "case area" involved in this litigation:
[Tihat portion of the State of Washington west of the Cascade Mountains and
north of the Columbia River drainage area, and includes the American portion
of the Puget Sound watershed, the watersheds of the Olympic Peninsula north
of the Grays Harbor watershed, and the offshore waters adjacent to those
areas.
United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 328 (W.D. Wash. 1974).
3. These payments totalled $207,500. Washington v. Washington Fishing Vessel
Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 677 (1979).
4. The United States also agreed to establish free agricultural and industrial schools
on the reservations, to provide smith and carpenter shops with tools, to employ a black-
smith, carpenter, and farmer to instruct the Indians in these occupations, and to supply
a physician to care for the treaty Indians. E.g., Treaty of Medicine Creek art. X, Dec. 26,
1854, 10 Stat. 1132, 1134 (1855).
5. See, e.g., Treaty of Medicine Creek art. II, Dec. 26, 1854, 10 Stat. 1132, 1134
(1855):
There is, however, reserved for the present use and occupation of the said
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tribes expressly reserved the right to fish at "all usual and accus-
tomed grounds and stations. . . in common with citizens of the
territory."'6 Throughout the twentieth century, state and federal
courts have labored over a workable delineation of the extent
and meaning of those rights. Representative of the judiciary's
failure to adequately resolve the conflict is a series of seven
United States Supreme Court decisions, from 1905 to the
present, interpreting the key treaty phrase "in common with."
Despite these decisions, the conflict and litigation among treaty
fishermen, non-treaty fishermen, and the State of Washington
continues.8
tribes and bands, the following tracts of land... all which tracts shall be set
apart, and, so far as necessary, surveyed and marked out for their exclusive
use; nor shall any white man be permitted to reside upon the same* without
permission of the tribe and the superintendent or agent.
6. E.g., id., art. III:
The right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations, is
further secured to said Indians in common with all citizens of the Territory,
and of erecting temporary houses for the purpose of curing, together with the
privilege of hunting, gathering roots and berries, and pasturing their horses on
open and unclaimed lands. Provided, however, that they shall not take shell-
fish from any beds staked or cultivated by citizens, and that they shall alter all
stallions not intended for breeding-horses, and shall keep up and confine the
latter.
The right to fish "in common with" other citizens refers to off-reservation. fishing. On-
reservation fishing was supposedly one of the exclusive uses to which the Indians could
put their reservations. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 332 n.12 (W.D.
Wash. 1974). In recent years, however, state control over on-reservation fishing has
increased. In Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Game Dep't, 433 U.S. 165 (1977), the United
States Supreme Court sanctioned regulation of on-reservation fishing. In Washington v.
Washington Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979), the Court then concluded that
fish caught on the reservation should be counted as part of the tribe's allocable share.
The Court reasoned that the place fish are caught is irrelevant to the question of
whether they are counted in the share.
7. Washington v. Washington Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979); Puyallup
Tribe v. Washington Game Dep't, 443 U.S. 165 (1977); Washington Game Dep't v.
Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44 (1973); Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game, 391 U.S. 392
(1968); Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681 (1942); Seufert Bros. v. United States, 249
U.S. 194 (1919); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
8. Although Congress has not been actively involved in this controversy, judicial
activism may trigger legislative restrictions in the form of treaty abrogation. Abrogation
refers to legislative modification of an existing treaty. Congress can unilaterally abrogate
any treaty; the "power to abrogate is based on the notion that a treaty represents the
political policy of the nation at the time it was made. If there is a change of circum-
stances and the national interest accordingly 'demands' modification of its terms, then
Congress may abrogate a treaty in whole or in part." Wilkinson & Volkman, Judicial
Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation, 63 CALiF. L. REV. 601, 604 (1975) (citing Lone Wolf
v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903)).
The abrogation of a treaty, is a complicated and difficult procedure beyond the
scope of this comment. Nonetheless, judges should realize that their decisions could ulti-
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This Comment analyzes and discusses this ongoing contro-
versy, focusing on the treaty Indians' history,' the background of
the treaty negotiations and signings,"e the principles of construc-
tion governing the interpretation of Indian treaties," and the
relevant legal precedents.' 2 It attempts to construct a coherent
approach to the Washington fishing rights controversy empha-
sizing that the Washington Indians' paramount purpose in these
treaties was maintaining the right to fish. Two lower court cases
that successfully took account of the Indians' purpose and
meaningfully effectuated that purpose in relation to twentieth
century developments are Judge Boldt's decision in United
States v. Washington (Boldt)'5 and Judge Orrick's opinion in
United States v. Washington (Phase II).14 This Comment
mately result in congressional modification of those same treaty rights. Abrogation is a
feasible means of limiting judicial treaty construction.
Senator Gorton (Wash.) and Representative Bonker (Wash.) recently introduced
legislation to modify the Pacific Northwest Indian treaties. Steelhead Trout Protection
Act, S. 874, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 2978, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). The bill
would explicitly override any Federal Court decision allowing Indians to commercially
harvest steelhead. Id. § 3. As of this writing the bill has been referred to the Senate
Select Committee on Indian Affairs and the House Committees on Interior and Insular
Affairs and Merchant Marine and Fisheries.
In an area of law closely related to the Phase II decision, one commentator has
suggested that Congress partially abrogate the implied-reservation-of-water doctrine
because Indians have a potential monopoly over water rights in the western United
States. See note 192 infra and accompanying text.
9. See text accompanying notes 21-31 infra.
10. See text accompanying notes 17-21 infra.
11. See text accompanying notes 65-69 infra.
12. See text accompanying notes 32-64 infra.
13. 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974).
14. 506 F. Supp. 187 (W.D. Wash. 1980), appeal docketed, No. 81-3111 (9th Cir.
Feb. 23, 1981). The case is a direct continuation of the Boldt litigation. The litigation
started when the United States filed suit in 1970, on its own behalf as a trustee for seven
Indian tribes. The initial party plaintiff tribes were the Hoh, Makah, Muckleshoot, Nis-
qually, Puyallup, Quileute, and Skokomish. Subsequently, the following fourteen tribes
intervened as plaintiffs on their own behalf: The Duwamish, Jamestown Band of Clal-
lam, Lower Elwha Samish, Sauk-Suiattle, Snohomish, Snoqualamie, Tulalip, Upper Ska-
git River, the Yakima Nation, Lummi, Quinault, Squaxin Island and Stillaguamish. The
defendants included the State of Washington, the State Departments of Fisheries and
Game, the directors of these agencies, and the Washington Reef Net Owners Association.
Additional organizations and agencies participated as amici curiae in various courts.
Boldt, 384 F. Supp. at 327.
The complex procedural history of this litigation involves several opinions and vari-
ous appeals; an initial outline of cases and their procedural history is helpful. United
States v. Washington (Boldt), 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), a/f'd, 520 F.2d 676
(9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976); United States v. Washington, 459 F.
Supp. 1020 (W.D. Wash. 1974-78), various appeals dismissed, 573 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir.
1978), decisions at 459 F. Supp. 1020, 1097-1118 (W.D. Wash. 1977-78), afrd sub nom.
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endorses the innovative approach of those two decisions.
II. BACKGROUND
Before the white population of the Northwest began to grow
in the 1840's, the area's Indians roamed freely, fishing and hunt-
ing where they pleased. 1' With the arrival of the white man,
however, the Indian culture changed drastically. The pioneers
demanded that the federal government negotiate treaties with
the Indians to free the land for unimpeded settlement.1' Consis-
tent with its policy of taking Indian lands by consent rather
than by conquest, 17 the United States appointed Isaac I. Stevens
the first governor of Washington and superintendent of Indian
affairs;18 his primary responsibility was negotiating treaties with
the Indians.1 ' Stevens initially proposed to centralize the North-
west tribes on one or two large tracts of land, thus avoiding fur-
ther conflict with the settlers and facilitating federal control
over the Indians.2 0 The government hoped this move would also
convert the Indians to an agrarian culture."1 What Stevens had
not considered was the Indians' refusal to give up the right to
Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington, 573 F.2d 1123 (9th Cir. 1978), aff'd in part, vacated in part, and remanded
sub nom. Washington v. Washington Fishing Vessels Ass'n (Phase 1), 443 U.S. 658
(1979).
15. Boldt, 384 F. Supp. at 350-53.
16. Comment, State Power And The Indian Treaty Right To Fish, 59 CALIF. L.
Ray. 485, 485-86, (1971).
17. "[T]he policy of the Congress, [which] continued throughout our history, [was]
to extinguish Indian title through negotiation rather than by force. . . ." Tee-Hit-Ton
Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 273 (1955), quoted in Department of Game v.
Puyallup Tribe, Inc., 70 Wash. 2d 245, 249, 422 P.2d 754, 757 (1967). Accord, Comment,
Indian Treaty Analysis And Off-Reservation Fishing Rights: A Case Study, 51 WASH. L.
Rsv. 61, 70 (1975).
18. UNCOMMON CosRrovsnsy, supra note 1, at 18-25. The authors describe Stevens
as a dynamo of energy who saw his job in Washington as an opportunity to win notice in
the East. In less than a year he negotiated treaties with over seventeen thousand Indians,
extinguishing their title to sixty-four million acres of land.
19. Id. at 18. The United States also assigned Stevens the task of surveying the
Northwest for possible railway routes.
20. Id. at 20-21.
21. Commentators have referred to this as the "Vanishing Indian" theory; the con-
tinuing demand for modern day recognition of 19th century treaty rights points out just
how faulty that theory is. As early as 1864, Henry A. Webster, a perceptive Makah
Indian agent, wrote: "I have been of the opinion for a long time that one of the most
practical methods of directly benefiting these Indians is by aiding them in their fisheries
.... " The government ignored Webster's suggestions. UNCOMMON CoNTRovatsY, supra




Fish have always played a very important role in the Pacific
Northwest Indians' economy and culture; the right to continue
fishing dominated treaty negotiations. The Western Washington
Indians were traditionally known as "fish-eaters" because their
diets, social customs, and religious practices centered around the
fish. 2 Tribes traded fish among themselves and with the white
man.23 The tribes also performed religious rites to insure the
return of salmon each year.24 A special dignitary, the salmon
chief, supervised these religious services, the actual fishing, and
the ultimate distribution of the catch throughout the village.25
The common cultural link between all the signatory tribes was
their dependence on fish.2
The Indians' obvious dependence on fish and their desire to
maintain the freedom to fish apparently impressed Stevens
because each of the treaties includes a phrase assuring the Indi-
ans the right to fish "in common with" all citizens of the terri-
tory.2 Retention of this right was the one indispensable require-
ment to any treaty with the Northwest Indians.28 As Stevens
himself acknowledged: "it was .. . thought necessary to allow
them to fish at all accustomed places."2
It is important to note that the Indians reserved these
rights. "In other words the treaty was not a grant of rights to the
Indians but a grant of rights from them .. .a reservation of
22. United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676, 682 (9th Cir. 1975). Judge Boldt
characterized the Indians as hunters and gatherers.
From the earliest known times, up to and beyond the time of the Stevens'
treaties, the Indians comprising each of the treating tribes and bands were pri-
marily a fishing, hunting and gathering people dependent almost entirely upon
the natural animal and vegetative resources of the region for their subsistence
and culture. They were heavily dependent upon anadromous fish for their sub-
sistence and for trade with other tribes and later with the settlers. Anadromous
fish was the great staple of their diet and livelihood. They cured and dried
large quantities for year around use, both for themselves and for others
through sale, trade, barter and employment.
Boldt, 384 F. Supp. at 406.
23. Phase I, 443 U.S. at 665 nn. 6 & 7.
24. Id.
25. R. SPENCER & J. JENNINGS, THE NATIVE AMERICANS, 219-20, 222 (1965), quoted
in Comment, supra note 16, at 485 n.4.
26. See note 17 supra.
27. See, e.g., Treaty of Medicine Creek art. III, Dec. 26, 1854, 10 Stat. 1132, 1134
(1855).
28. UNCOMMON CoNTRovsY, supra note 1, at 21.
29. Id.
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those not granted."30 Felix Cohen, a noted expert, has called this
the most basic principle of Indian law.31 Fundamentally, the
treaty Indians intended to and did keep the right to fish. Any
superior fishing right they may have results from that reserva-
tion and not from special government treatment.
III. PRECEDENT
The first United States Supreme Court case interpreting
these treaties, United States v. Winans,32 set the tone for future
litigation. In Winans the Court upheld the Indians' right to fish
at all usual and accustomed places, concluding a private land-
owner could neither exclude treaty fishermen from his land nor
set up fish wheels88 which could destroy an entire fish run.
Although the Court recognized that the treaty accorded Indians
a special status and construction of treaty language must give
effect to the central purpose of the treaty," the Court, in unsup-
ported dictum, also recognized state regulation of treaty rights.
In reference to the retained fishing right, Justice McKenna,
speaking for the court said: "Nor does it restrain the state
unreasonably, if at all, in the regulation of the right. '8 5 This dic-
tum narrowed and confused the ultimate holding.
In the years following Winans, Washington courts, relying
on this dictum, upheld state power to regulate the treaty
fishermen and routinely sustained treaty Indians' convictions for
failure to comply with regulations imposed equally on all
fishermen. 86 In 1942, however, the United States Supreme Court
decided Tulee v. Washington,87 and held that the state could
not require treaty fishermen to purchase licenses. The Court
reasoned that it was anomalous to charge the treaty fishermen
for exercising the very right their ancestors had expressly
30. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905).
31. F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDAN LAw 122 (U.N.M. ed. 1972). For an
analysis of reserved rights see notes 70-89 infra and accompanying text.
32. 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
33. A fish wheel is a very destructive device that can catch salmon by the ton
rapidly decreasing the available supply until the entire run is destroyed. Id. at 372 (argu-
ment of the Solicitor General).
34. Id. at 380-81.
35. Id. at 384.
36. State v. Wallahee, 143 Wash. 117, 255 P. 94 (1927); State v. Menniock, 115
Wash. 528, 197 P. 641 (1921); State v. Alexis, 89 Wash. 492, 154 P. 810 (1916); State v.
Towessnute, 89 Wash. 478, 154 P. 805 (1916).
37. 315 U.S. 681 (1942).
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reserved.38 Nonetheless, the Court upheld the state power to
regulate as long as those regulations were "necessary for conser-
vation of the fish."39 The Court concluded that license fees were
not necessary for conservation. 0 Unfortunately, Tulee failed to
give the lower courts any guidance in applying the new conserva-
tion standard.
After Tulee, the lower federal courts and state courts wres-
tled with the inadequately framed "necessary for conservation"
standard. Some courts attempted to give meaningful content to
the phrase, while others refused to recognize any state power
over federal treaty rights.48 The accommodation of these com-
peting interests continued in Puyallup Tribe v. Department of
Game (Puyallup 1).44 That case began when the Washington
State Departments of Fisheries and Game brought suit against
the Puyallup Tribe seeking declaratory judgment that the tribe
was not immune from state regulation of net fishing. In an
attempt to refine the Tulee standard, the majority enumerated a
vague three-part test for acceptable state regulation: the regula-
tion must be necessary for conservation, must meet "appropriate
standards," and must not discriminate against the Indians.4"
38. Id. at 684-85.
39. Id. at 684. The Court cited two cases: Kennedy v. Becker, 241 U.S. 556 (1916),
and United States v. Winans 198 U.S. 371 (1905). Kennedy can be distinguished because
it involved a privilege rather than a reserved right. Boldt, 384 F. Supp. at 336-37. The
dictum in Winans on state regulation is unpersuasive. See notes 43 & 44 infra and
accompanying text. Kennedy relied in part on Winans and on Ward v. Race Horse, 163
U.S. 504 (1896). 241 U.S. at 564. Ward, however, involved exhausted rather than contin-
uing treaty rights. Boldt, 384 F. Supp. at 335-36. Critics have discredited the Ward
Court's linguistic and legalistic approach. See, e.g., State v. Arthur, 74 Idaho 251, 257-61,
261 P.2d 135, 138-40 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 937 (1954).
40. Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 685 (1942).
41. Winans and Tulee signalled the beginning of the conflicting federal and state
interpretations of "in common with," with state courts holding it guaranteed only equal
protection and federal courts finding greater implied rights. Ironically, in the earliest
cases interpreting these treaties the court holdings reflected exactly the opposite view-
points. See United States v. Taylor, 3 Wash. Terr. 88, 50 P. 333 (1887) (Indians had a
right to cross the land of a bona fide purchaser for value to get to a usual fishing spot).
But cf. United States v. Swan, 50 F. 108 (D. Wash. 1892) (treaties only secured equality
of rights not privileges).
42. Maison v. Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation, 314 F.2d 169
(9th Cir. 1963).
43. See e.g., State v. Arthur, 74 Idaho 251, 261 P.2d 135 (1953); see also State v.
Satiacum, 50 Wash. 2d 513, 314 P.2d 400 (1957).
44. 391 U.S. 392 (1968). For a more complete discussion of Puyallup I see Hobbs,
Indian Hunting and Fishing Rights II, 37 Gao. WASH. L. REv. 1251 (1969).
45. 391 U.S. at 399.
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Like the Winans dictum on the state's right to regulate,"' how-
ever, the Puyallup I standards were too vague to have any prac-
tical significance. Although the Court authorized application of a
different standard for measuring the validity of regulations when
applied to treaty fishermen, it did not spell out the elements of
that standard. On remand, the Washington courts upheld the
ban on net fishing under the Puyallup I test,4 7 but in a pivotal
decision the United States Supreme Court reversed.
In Washington Game Department v. Puyallup Tribe
(Puyallup II)" Justice Douglas' majority opinion held that the
state's regulations discriminated against treaty fishermen
because the state allowed non-treaty sports fishermen to catch
steelhead and thus had effectively preempted the Indian
fishery."9 More importantly, the Puyallup II Court determined
that acceptable regulations must apportion the number of
harvestable fish between treaty and non-treaty fishermen.50 The
Court construed the "in common with" treaty language as
requiring that Indians receive a proportionate share of the fish, 1
but Douglas refused to devise an apportionment formula
because of the many variables involved.5'
While state reconsideration of the apportionment was pend-
ing in the Washington courts, Judge Boldt, a Federal District
Judge in Western Washington, decided United States v. Wash-
ington.53 The case began in 1970 when the United States and
seven Indian tribes initiated an action against the State of
Washington for declaratory and injunctive relief concerning off-
reservation treaty fishing." Although Boldt succeeded in giving
meaning and content to several of the vague phrases courts had
dealt with throughout the fishing rights controversy, such as "in
46. 198 U.S. at 384-85.
47. The Washington Supreme Court had held that the total ban on net fishing was
justifiable, provided new fishing regulations were made annually for the tribes. Depart-
ment of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, 80 Wash. 2d 561, 571, 575, 497 P.2d 171, 177, 180
(1970).
48. 414 U.S. 44 (1973).
49. Id. at 48.
50. "The aim is to accommodate the rights of the Indians under the Treaty and the
rights of other people." Id. at 48-49.
51. Id. at 48 (citing Puyallup L 391 U.S. at 398-99).
52. Id.
53. 384 F. Supp. at 312.
54. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court
reviewed and substantially affirmed this decision. For the complete procedural history of
the case see note 14 supra.
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common with" and "necessary for conservation," the decision
did not gain universal acceptance. The most controversial aspect
of the opinion was Judge Boldt's decision that treaty Indians are
entitled to fifty percent of each harvestable fish run. In render-
ing his decision Judge Boldt relied on the treaties, their histori-
cal context, the Indian's cultural dependence on fish, and legal
precedent. The opinion is a significant contribution to the legal
interpretation of Indian treaty fishing rights and is in many
ways the "touchstone" for future analysis in the area.'5
In 1977, the United States Supreme Court decided the final
case in the Puyallup trilogy, Puyallup Tribe v. Department of
Game (Puyallup III),6 and sub silentio ratified the apportion-
ment formula in Boldt. In Puyallup III the Court affirmed the
Washington Supreme Court's determination that treaty
fishermen were entitled to forty-five percent of each steelhead
trout run, but the state courts' recalcitrance continued. Follow-
ing the Boldt decision, nontreaty fishermen challenged regula-
tions promulgated to implement the district court's mandate. In
Washington State Commercial Fishing Vessel Association v.
Tollefson 7 and Puget Sound Gillnetters Association v. Moos"
the Washington courts refused to follow Boldt and struck down
the regulations. State recalcitrance, termed the "most concerted
official and private effort to frustrate a decree of a federal court
in this century,"' 9 eventually led to increased supervision by the
Boldt court. Amidst this atmosphere of judicial conflict and
state defiance, the United States Supreme Court handed down
55. Judge Boldt's opinion is generally regarded as a landmark decision. One com-
mentator described the difficulty of Boldt's task:
These conflicts [among Indians, non-Indians, and the state] resulted in a his-
tory of state seizures of Indian fishing nets and equipment, or their destruction
by sportsmen, culminating in a series of armed confrontations in the 1960's.
The parties struck militant positions. Against this backdrop, Judge Boldt was
asked to apply the dry aesthetics of legal principle. Lacking the guidance of
clear and precise doctrine, Judge Boldt was forced to wind his way through 200
years of judicial uncertainty and misstatement.
Comment, supra note 17, at 63-64.
56. 433 U.S. 165 (1977). For a more comprehensive discussion of Puyallup III see
Comment, State Regulation of Indian Treaty Fishing Rights: Putting Puyallup III into
Perspective, 13 GONZ. L. Rav. 140 (1977).
57. 89 Wash. 2d 276, 571 P.2d 1373 (1977).
58. 88 Wash. 2d 677, 565 P.2d 1151 (1977).
59. Phase 1, 443 U.S. at 696 n.36 (citing Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. United
States District Court, 573 F.2d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir. 1978)). In Puget Sound Gillnetters
Ass'n, the court upheld continued district court control until the state followed the
decree.
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its most definitive fishing rights decision to date. 0
Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger
Fishing Vessel Association (Phase I) was the seventh United
States Supreme Court decision construing the treaty phrase "in
common with." Justice Stevens' opinion expressly affirmed the
logic and reasoning of Boldt's percentage allocation method,
although there were significant modifications. Boldt concluded
that each user group had a right to take up to fifty percent of
the fish runs at all usual and accustomed places. 1 Under Phase
I, however, the Indian's fifty percent share represents a strict
maximum figure subject to future downward adjustments.2
According to the Court the treaties only guaranteed the Indians
enough fish to ensure a "moderate living" subject to the fifty
percent ceiling. Several issues raised but left unresolved in
Phase I included: whether the treaty Indians' allocated share
should include hatchery fish; 3 and whether there is an implied
right to have the fish protected from environmental
degradation."
IV. TREATY INTERPRETATION
In each of these fishing rights cases the central issue is
treaty interpretation. As in all legal interpretation, principles of
construction govern the analysis of treaty terms; in addition,
special rules govern construction of Indian treaties." The most
oft-cited of these principles is that courts construe treaty terms
in the way the Indians most probably understood them, not in a
60. Phase 1, 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
61. Boldt, 384 F. Supp. at 343.
62. Phase I, 443 U.S. at 685-86.
63. Phase II, 506 F. Supp. at 190.
64. Id.
65. These special rules govern because the Indians were supposedly looking to the
United States for protection; therefore, the United States had a duty not to overreach.
This duty is grounded in the notion that the United States presumptively had superior
negotiating skills and knowledge of the language. For the cases setting out these rules see
Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47 (1929); Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1 (1899); Choctaw
Nation v. United States, 119 U.S. 1 (1886); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383
(1886); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30
U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). Chief Justice Marshall once characterized the relationship
between the United States and the Indians as one between guardian and ward. Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17 (McLean, J., concurring). Contra, Department
of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, 86 Wash. 2d 664, 673-74, 548 P.2d 1058, 1066 (1976) (citing
DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 447 (1975), wherein the Court said that
canons of construction are not licenses to disregard clear expressions).
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technical or legal sense.6" This principle reflects judicial recogni-
tion that there were extraordinary communication and transla-
tion problems between the Indians and settlers . 7 It is particu-
larly apposite here because not only are the treaties written in
English but, at Governor Steven's insistence, the parties negoti-
ated in a 300 word trade medium known as Chinook jargon."
This medium could not adequately express the technical mean-
ing of many key phrases, including "in common with."' 9
Under these circumstances it is inappropriate to rely on a
purely linguistic approach. Instead the courts should attempt to
construe these treaties in the manner in which the Indians most
66. These canons of interpretation embody a judicial perception that the United
States offered to protect the Indians and that the Indians relied upon the offer. The
United States Supreme Court has consistently protected the intentions and assumptions
of the Indian negotiators.
The United States, as the party with the presumptively superior negotiating
skills and superior knowledge of the language in which the treaty is recorded,
has a responsibility to avoid taking advantage of the other side. 'The treaty
must therefore be construed, not according to the technical meaning of its
words to learned lawyers, but in the sense in which they would naturally be
understood by the Indians.'
Phase II, 506 F. Supp. at 195 (quoting Phase I, 443 U.S. at 675-76 (quoting in part from
Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 11 (1899)). Because of this presumption of superior skills
and knowledge the courts have held the United States to an affirmative duty not to take
advantage of the Indians. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
Accord, Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 631 (1970); United States v. Sho-
shone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111, 116 (1938); Seufert Bros. v. United States, 249 U.S. 194, 195
(1919); Starr v. Long Jim, 257 U.S. 613, 622-23 (1913). Commentators have stressed the
unique nature of the trust relationship between the United States and the Indians, stat-
ing: "Judicial interpretation of Indian Treaties has resulted in a legal relationship and a
body of law which are truly sui generis." Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 8, at 614
(citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553-55 (1974); United States v. Sandoval, 231
U.S. 28, 39 (1913); Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States, 364 F.2d 320, 322 (Ct. Cl.
1966)). Moreover, the authors note that this duty is singularly applicable to Indians. Id.
(citing United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 110 (1935); Choctaw Nation v.
United States, 119 U.S. 1, 27 (1886); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886)).
For another analysis of this trust relationship see Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of
the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians, 27 ST~AN. L. REV. 1213 (1975).
67. Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 8, at 610. "The Indian treaties were written
only in English making it a certainty that semantic and interpretational problems would
arise." Id. See Whitefoot v. United States, 293 F.2d 658, 667 (Ct. Cl. 1961), cert. denied,
369 U.S. 818 (1962). See, e.g., Duwamish Indians v. United States, 79 Ct. Cl. 530 (1934).
68. UNCOMMON CoNTRovERSy, supra note 1, at 21-23. "Owen Bush, one of Stevens'
staff present at the negotiations, stated: 'I could talk the Indian languages, but Stevens
did not seem to want anyone to interpret in their own tongue and had that done in
Chinook."' E. MEzKER, PioNim RMINISCENcEs 208 (1905). In his book Meeker also
stated that Stevens was intoxicated and unfit for business at the treaty negotiations. Id.
at 258.
69. Boldt, 384 F. Supp. at 356.
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probably understood them. To do so the courts must undertake
a vigorous examination of the social, cultural, and economic per-
spectives of the signatory tribes in order to accurately attribute
meaning to treaty terms. Courts must look beyond the language
used, especially when the meaning of that language could not be
conveyed through the negotiation medium. The courts' consis-
tent failure to take account of the non-literal factors noted
above has resulted in conflicting resolution of legal issues.
A. Striving to Define "In Common With"
1. The Equal Opportunity Theory
One proposed solution to the state regulation/treaty rights
problem that non-treaty fishermen promulgated and the Wash-
ington courts70 accepted at one point, is that "in common with"
only assures the treaty fishermen equal protection of the law,
thus they only have the same rights as anyone else.71 Although
this may appeal to the American ideal of judging each person
individually, 2 it ignores the fact that these are reserved treaty
rights, not favorable treatment being accorded to a certain
group. Bearing this in mind, the federal courts have implicitly
and explicitly rejected this equal opportunity approach. In
Winans, the Court implicitly recognized that the treaty tribes
had special rights, holding that a private land owner could not
exclude treaty fishermen from usual and accustomed fishing
places on his land. In Tulee, the Court again held that treaty
fishermen had greater rights than non-treaty fishermen, limiting
state regulation of treaty fishing to those regulations necessary
for conservation.78 Under the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment, state regulation of nonfundamental rights
will survive judicial scrutiny if it is rationally related to permis-
sible state objectives.7' As long as the relationship of means to
70. See, e.g., Washington State Commercial Fishing Vessel Ass'n v. Tollefson, 89
Wash. 2d 276, 571 P. 2d 1373 (1977); Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. Moos, 88 Wash.
2d 677, 565 P.2d 1151 (1977).
71. Washington State Commerical Fishing Vessel Ass'n v. Tollefson, 89 Wash. 2d at
281, 571 P.2d at 1376.
72. See also Kaplan, Equal Justice In An Unequal World: Equality For The
Negro-The Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 363, 380 (1966). The
author states: "[A] man is entitled to be judged on his own individual merits alone
73. 341 U.S. at 685.
74. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372
U.S. 726 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
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ends is not arbitrary or capricious, the law will stand."" In regu-
lation of Indian fishing rights, however, the Court requires that
state acts be necessary for conservation, a stricter standard than
mere rationality. The Court imposed this standard because it
recognized the special treaty right."'
Judge Boldt noted in United States v. Washington,7 that
the primary flaw with the equal opportunity argument is its fail-
ure to focus on the fact that the Indians expressly reserved these
rights. The fishing rights are not derived from United States or
Washington State citizenship, but come from the Indians' ances-
tors' express reservation in a federal treaty. Prior to the treaties,
there was not the "shadow of impediment" 78 to the exercise of
these rights. The right to fish was part of the totality of rights
Indians enjoyed before the arrival of the American pioneer. 9
When they signed the Stevens' treaties, the Indians gave up
many of those rights, but not the right to fish. If forfeiture of the
fishing right had been a condition of the treaties, the tribes
would not have signed.80
Indeed, Phase I explicitly rejected the equal opportunity
argument s' and should have ended litigation on the subject. Jus-
tice Stevens, noting that prior to the treaties the Indians had
freely exercised their rights to meet any and all of their needs by
taking fish,82 stated that it would be unlikely the signatory
Chiefs perceived a reservation of the fishing right as "merely the
chance, shared with millions of other citizens, occasionally to dip
their nets . . . ."8 Stevens emphasized the Indians' perception
of these reserved rights and relied on maxims of construction
75. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960). The Court stated: "[T]he Due
Process Clause can be thought to impose a bar only if the statute manifests a patently
arbitrary classification, utterly lacking in rational justification."
76. Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. at 684. The Court stated that the treaty Indians
had "continuing rights, beyond those which other citizens may enjoy, to fish at their
'usual and accustomed places'...."
77. 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974).
78. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. at 381. Justice McKenna noted that fishing
rights were almost as necessary to the treaty tribes as the air they breathed. He also
stated that construing these treaties solely to insure an equal opportunity is an "impo-
tent outcome to negotiations and a convention which seemed to... give the word of the
Nation for more." Id. at 380.
79. Id. at 381.
80. UNCOMMON CONTROVERSY, supra note 1, at 21.
81. Phase I, 443 U.S. at 679-80.
82. Id. at 665-69.
83. Id. at 679.
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that mandate consideration of the Indian viewpoint"' Stevens
also pointed out that the phrasing of the treaties did not place
Indians and pioneers on an equal footing.8 The phrase "said
Indians"8 6 who would share the right with all citizens refers to
the tribes listed in the opening section of each treaty,"7 not to
individual Indians. Consequently, the right is a class right rather
than an individual right. Additionally, Stevens said that all trea-
ties are essentially contracts and, like contracts, need considera-
tion. 8 In this case the Indians were paid $207,500 for their land.
According to Stevens that figure coupled with a mere equal
opportunity to fish is inadequate consideration for the vast
tracts of land the signatory tribes ceded to the United States.89
2. The Easement Theory"
A second definition of "in common with" does assure the
treaty Indians greater rights but, like the equal opportunity
argument, fails to adequately effectuate the treaties. According
to the easement, or access, theory the treaty Indians have prop-
erty rights rather than fishing rights. They are given access to
their usual and accustomed fishing spots, 1 but once they reach
the water they are subject to state regulation to the same extent
as the non-treaty fishermen.
Although the easement theory has its roots in Winans, it is
not without modern day supporters. In Phase I, Justice Powell's
dissent92 reiterated the logical framework of the argument. Pow-
ell contended that the compelling inference to be drawn from
the treaty negotiations is that the treaty Indians only retained
the right to go to their usual fishing places and fish there equally
with non-treaty fishermen.' 3 Powell points out that while the
ultimate purpose of the treaties was the peaceful resolution of
Indian/pioneer tension, the negotiators feared that restriction of
84. See notes 65-69 supra and accompanying text.
85. Phase I, 443 U.S. at 679.
86. E.g., Treaty of Medicine Creek art. III, Dec. 26, 1854, 10 Stat. 1130 (1855).
87. E.g., id., preamble.
88. Phase I, 443 U.S. at 675-77 (citing Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903)).
89. 443 U.S. at 676-77.
90. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. at 384. The Supreme Court said: "[I]t [the
treaty) only fixes in the land such easements as enables the right to be exercised."
91. Phase I, 443 U.S. at 697-98 (Powell, J., dissenting; Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ.,
joining the dissent).
92. 443 U.S. at 699-708.
93. Id. at 697-98.
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the Indians "might interfere with their securing food."" Indians
needed "liberty of motion,"'95 to acquire food, and to assure free
movement to fishing places the Indians needed rights of ingress
and egress." Under this interpretation, the treaty right is the
equivalent of an easement.
The problem with Powell's historical viewpoint is that it
focuses on the white man's purpose, not the Indians'. For Gover-
nor Stevens, the ultimate purpose may have been resolution of
tension, but the Indians' paramount objective was retaining the
right to fish." Courts must construe these treaties as the Indians
probably understood them.98 Because the concept of land owner-
ship was foreign to the Indian culture,9" it is questionable that
they understood the treaties only assured them easements. The
Indians' signature on the treaty documents is evidence of their
belief that the treaties assured them a continuing and meaning-
ful right to fish.100 In 1854, or even 1905, it may have been true
that an easement was adequate to allow the Indians to meet
their fishing needs. That does not mean, however, that the
treaty tribes only intended to reserve an easement or that an
easement is the extent of their rights in 1981. Today a right of
access, alone, is meaningless if once the fisherman reaches the
water he is subject to the same regulations as the non-treaty
fishermen.
Although application of the governing maxims of construc-
tion discredits the easement argument, one need not go that far.
According to the treaty language the signatory tribes retained
the "right of taking fish." 101 A right to take fish, by definition,
implies more than a right to go to the water and "dip one's net."
The phrase is particularly significant in the context of this liti-
gation because salmon are anadromous fish. 0 " They hatch in
94. Id. at 699.
95. Id. at 700.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 667. Not only was protecting the right vital but the white negotiators
invited and allowed the Indians to rely on the United States to protect that right. Id.
n.11.
98. See text accompanying notes 65-69 supra.
99. UNCOMMON CoNTrovEmsy, supra note 1, at 21. To the white man land was some-
thing to be owned and fenced in; to the Indians it was part of their religious heritage, not
an article of trade.
100. Id.
101. E:g., Treaty of Medicine Creek art. III, Dec. 26, 1854, 10 Stat. 1130 (1855).
102. Phase I, 443 U.S. at 662. Different species have different life cycles: some
return to spawn only once, while others return several times. The relative predictability
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fresh water, swim out to sea, where they live out most of their
adult lives, and then return to their birthplace to spawn. 10 Due
to the cyclic nature of their lives, their runs are very predictable;
thus salmon are quite easy to catch. Therefore the right to take
fish is analogous to harvesting crops and implicitly guarantees
more than the right to get to the place where one usually takes
fish.
3. The Meaningful Content of "Necessary for Conservation."
By far the modern courts' most common approach to the
fishing rights controversy has been to try to give some meaning-
ful content to the Tulee "necessary for conservation" standard,
attempting to balance and preserve both the treaty rights and
the state's right to regulate. Following Tulee the United States
Supreme Court did not decide a case arising under a Stevens'
treaty until Puyallup I in 1968. There the United States
Supreme Court upheld and refined Tulee's "necessary for con-
servation" standard. Justice Douglas stated that in order to pass
judicial scrutiny the regulations must be necessary for conserva-
tion, must meet appropriate standards, and must not discrimi-
nate.'" In United States v. Washington, Judge Boldt defined
and delineated the vague Puyallup I guidelines so that they
were susceptible of practical application. In order to be neces-
sary for conservation the regulation must be designed to pre-
serve the resource and carry out the treaties' purpose. 0 5 Meet-
ing appropriate standards required a full and fair public
consideration of proposed regulations. 1 6 Finally, a regulation
would be nondiscriminatory if it provided treaty fishermen a
of the runs make salmon quite easy to catch. By treaty time Indians fished throughout
western Washington using a variety of methods, in both marine and fresh water areas. It
is estimated that the annual harvest before non-Indian commercial fishing began was
18,000,000. J. CRAIG & R. HACKER, THE HISTORY AND DEV-LoPmEwr OF THE FISHERIES OF
THE COLUMBIA RIVER 141-42 (U.S. Bureau of Fisheries Bull. No. 32, 1940), cited in Com-
ment, supra note 16, at 485 n.2.
103. Boldt, 384 F. Supp. at 405.
104. 391 U.S. at 401-03. See also Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 207 (1975).
In Antoine, the United States Supreme Court reinterpreted its own Puyallup I guide-
lines. Justice Douglas, concurring, noted: "a state may exact a license when it comes to
non-Indians or to Indians with no federal hunting rights .... But Indians with federal
hunting 'rights' are quite different." Id. at 212 (Douglas, J., concurring).
105. Boldt, 384 F. Supp. at 402.
106. Id. Regulations that affect treaty fishing must receive a full, fair, and public




fifty percent share of each fish run."0 7 This fifty percent limita-
tion was by far the most controversial portion of the Boldt
opinion.
4. A Percentage Allocation
Judge Boldt's conclusion that treaty fishermen are entitled
to a fifty percent portion of each fish run was based on an equi-
table belief that "in common with" means sharing equally.108
Although this portion of his decision appears radical on its face,
Puyallup II had hinted at such a result 09 and subsequent deci-
sions reaffirmed the Boldt allocation, both implicitly1 and
explicitly.1
In Puyallup 11,112 although the Court refused to devise an
apportionment formula, it stated that the "number of steelhead
now caught by non-treaty fishermen must in some manner be
fairly apportioned between Indian net fishing and non-Indian
sports fishing . . . ."I If Puyallup H did not authorize the
Boldt solution, then clearly the Puyallup IIP1 4 Court's affirma-
tion of Washington's percentage allocation did. In that case the
Court was faced with the Washington steelhead controversy for
the third and final time.11 The Washington Supreme Court,
despite expansive dictum extolling the equal opportunity
approach,"" had concluded that a forty-five percent of the har-
vestable steelhead trout run should be allocated to the Puyal-
107. Id. at 342-43, 402-03.
108. Id. at 343.
109. See Puyallup H, 414 U.S. 44 (1973). For further discussion see text accom-
panying notes 114-15 infra.
110. See Puyallup III, 433 U.S. 165 (1977). For further discussion see text accom-
panying notes 114-17 infra.
111. Phase I, 443 U.S. at 685.
112. The Supreme Court remanded Puyallup I to determine if a total ban on net
fishing was necessary for conservation. Puyallup , 391 U.S. at 401-03. Puyallup H was
an appeal from this remand.
113. 414 U.S. at 48 (1973) (emphasis added).
114. This case was the Appeal from the remand of Puyallup II.
115. These cases were litigated in state court and must be differentiated from Boldt,
which was a federal court case.
116. Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Game Dep't, 86 Wash. 2d 664, 664-81, 548 P.2d
1058, 1063-70 (1976). The court ultimately affirmed the lower court's percentage alloca-
tion because it was consistent with the Supreme Court's appropriation order. Puyallup
II, 414 U.S. at 48-49. The Washington Supreme Court withheld the portion of their opin-
ion dealing with the equal opportunity theory, pending the ultimate treaty interpretation
by the United States Supreme Court. 86 Wash. 2d at 688, 548 P.2d at 1074.
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lups."' The Supreme Court's ratification of this approach would
logically seem to extend to Boldt's allocation formula; the Wash-
ington courts, however, refused to make that reasonable
extension.
Following Boldt, the state issued regulations to implement
the decision.118 Nontreaty fishermen, reacting immediately,
brought lawsuits questioning the treaty interpretation in Boldt
and the District Court's authority to order state departments to
regulate for reasons other than conservation (i.e.-allocation to
treaty fishermen).'1 ' On review, the Washington Supreme Court
concluded that the treaties had only insured equal opportunity
and that the Boldt decree required state agencies to act beyond
the scope of their authority."20
5. Phase I
As a result of the state's continued adherence to the equal
opportunity theory the United States Supreme Court heard
arguments concerning the definition of "in common with" for
the seventh time.1" In Phase I the Court accepted the Boldt
court's percentage allocation formula. Not only did Justice Ste-
vens note two United States fishing treaties with Great Britain
which used the phrase "in common with" to mean sharing
equally,"' but he relied on other treaty phrases as well 28 to sup-
port the computation formula. He concluded that the "right of
taking fish ' is important not only to refute the easement/
access theory but also to affirm a percentage allocation. Analo-
117. 86 Wash. 2d at 688, 548 P.2d at 1074.
118. Phase I, 443 U.S. at 672.
119. Washington State Commercial Fishing Vessel Ass'n v. Tollefson, 89 Wash. 2d
276, 571 P.2d 677, 571 P.2d 1373 (1977).
120. Id. The United States Supreme Court expressly rejected both arguments. First,
the Court stated that the treaties did assure special rights, Phase I, 443 U.S. at 676-79,
and that such special rights did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, U.S. CONsr.
amend. XIV, § 1. The Court noted that prior discussions have consistently recognized
special Indian benefits because of the tribes' peculiar semi-sovereign nature. 443 U.S. at
673 n.20. One might also argue that the protected rights stem from treaties rather than
from a legislative, judicial, or administrative classification. Second, the Court noted that
the district court did have the power to order the state agencies, as parties to the litiga-
tion, to prepare rules that would implement the decision. Id. at 695. Additionally, if the
state chose to ignore the court orders, the court could displace local enforcement and
substitute its own rules. Id. at 695-96.
121. See note 6 supra.
122. Phase I, 443 U.S. at 677-78 n.23.
123. Id. at 678.
124. E.g., Treaty of Medicine Creek art. III, Dec. 26, 1854, 10 Stat. 1132 (1855).
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gizing the taking of anadromous fish to harvesting crops, 2 ' allo-
cation by mathematical formula is quite reasonable. As the
Court also pointed out, the results of Puyallup II and Puyallup
III support a percentage allocation and, Stevens argued, so does
Winans. In Winans the landowner had constructed fish wheels,
capable of destroying an entire fish run.'2 6 The Supreme Court
ordered a remand of that case with explicit instructions to
devise "some adjustment and accommodation"' to protect the
treaty Indians from total exclusion from the fishery. Stevens
pointed out that although the Court's accommodation language
is subject to interpretation, it definitely included a removal of
some of the fish wheels in order to make some fish available to
treaty fishermen.12 8 According to Stevens, the case "assured the
Indians a share of the fish. ''129
Although a fifty percent allocation of each harvestable fish
run may seem inequitable and unjust to some, re-examination of
the treaty purpose coupled with subsequent developments in
Washington's fisheries highlight and support Boldt's equitable
remedy. In analyzing these treaties it cannot be over-emphasized
that the Indians' sole purpose was the retention of a meaningful
right to take fish.130 The Indians' acceptance of Governor Ste-
vens' treaties was conditioned on retaining that fishing right and
Indian treaties are to be construed as the Indians probably
understood them.'8 ' If the Indian acceptance was conditional,
then their signature on the treaty documents indicates an under-
standing that they retained meaningful off-reservation fishing
rights. It is true that at the time the treaties were signed an
equal opportunity to catch fish was sufficient because there were
many more Indians than whites. 3 2 As the white population grew
and the treaty Indian's access to "usual and accustomed" fishing
places became restricted an easement was sufficient to insure the
125. Stevens noted that harvesting anadromous fish in akin to harvesting crops: the
harvest is stable and highly predictable, subject to sudden changes in climate. Phase I,
443 U.S. at 663.
126. 198 U.S. at 372.
127. Id. at 384.
128. Phase I, 443 U.S. at 681.
129. Id.
130. See text accompanying notes 22-29 supra.
131. See text accompanying notes 65-69 supra.
132. When the treaties were signed it is estimated that three quarters of the terri-
tory's 10,000 inhabitants were Indians. Phase 1, 443 U.S. at 664.
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treaty rights.3 s In the years that followed, the white man discov-
ered canning and processing and the non-Indian commercial
fishery boomed.13 The result of this economic windfall was non-
Indian domination and discriminatory state regulation which
tended to exclude the federally protected treaty fishermen." 5
None of these developments, however, altered the Indians' per-
ception of their treaty rights. Although allocation of what once
must have seemed an inexhaustible resource was neither dis-
cussed nor contemplated at the treaty negotiations, today alloca-
tion is the only way to secure treaty Indians the meaningful
fishing right their ancestors expressly reserved. Although Phase
I does support the logic and reason of Boldt's percentage alloca-
tion, significant modifications may dilute treaty rights, and will
definitely lead to further litigation.
6. The "Moderate Living" Standard
In United States v. Washington, Judge Boldt concluded
that each user group had a right to take up to fifty percent of
each harvestable fishing run.186 Under Phase I the treaty Indi-
ans' fifty percent is only a maximum or ceiling.13 7 The Court,
relying on Arizona v. California,' concluded that the treaty
Indians were only entitled to enough fish to insure them a "mod-
erate living."' 9 The Court stated that the fifty percent share
could be adjusted downward in response to changing circum-
stances. Two such circumstances were a tribe's dwindling to just
a few members or finding another means of support."1 0 The
phrase "moderate living" is inappropriate and confusing. A
court cannot measure a "moderate living" or how many fish will
ensure that the Indians maintain that vaguely defined standard
of living. The moderate living standard could lead to unneces-
sary government intrusion into the Indian culture because it
133. Indeed the basis of Justice Powell's dissent in Phase I is the compelling infer-
ence that since all the Indians needed to fish was access, that would be all they got. Id.
at 697-99 (Powell, J., dissenting).
134. Large-scale non-treaty fishing commenced in the 1890's and brought about the
need for state regulation. Boldt, 384 F. Supp. at 352.
135. Id. at 394, 404, 407. These destructive state practices included seizure, damage,
destruction, disposition, and unreasonably long detention of Indian fishing gear.
136. Id. at 342-43.
137. Phase I, 443 U.S. at 686 & n.27.
138. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).




would require continuous monitoring of the Indians' economic
conditions. The language about a tribe's dwindling or finding
another means of support should be limited and read as only
referring to Indian abrogation of the treaties.
Moreover, the Court's reliance on Arizona is misplaced. In
Arizona one of the issues the Court discussed was whether an
Indian reservation had implied water rights in an adjacent river
and how those rights were to be measured.141 According to Ste-
vens, Arizona stands for the proposition that the Indians have
rights to a certain amount of the resource "but not more than is
necessary to provide . . . a livelihood."' 42 In Arizona, however,
the Court specifically stated that they would not measure the
reserved water rights by the Indians' "reasonably foreseeable
needs" because those needs depended on the tribe's future num-
bers which could only be guessed at. 43 Instead, the Court con-
cluded that the number of irrigable acres should be the measur-
ing rod of the water rights."44 The Court examined what the
Indians retained in the treaty negotiations-a certain number of
acres-and then made those acres useful. The focus was on the
number of acres reserved at treaty time and not on the number
of Indians."45 In this controversy, the Indians reserved a right to
fish. Applying the Arizona logic, the courts should try to effectu-
ate that right without reference to the Indian population size.
The Court's focus on the treaty Indians' reasonably foresee-
able needs is also misplaced because it is based on an economic
analysis. As mentioned at the outset of this Comment Indians
have more than a mere economic relationship with the fish. Fish
have always played an important part in the Northwest Indians'
culture and religion."46 Placing principal analytic reliance on a
"moderate living" standard ignores this cultural dependency,
which was certainly one of the Indians' motivating factors in the
negotiations. Instead, the Court's focus should be on effectuating
141. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at 595-601.
142. Phase 1, 443 U.S. at 686.
143. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at 600-01. The Arizona Court relied on Winters
v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908), to find implied water rights. In Winters the Court
concluded that the United States had intended to deal fairly with the Indians, and that
such fair dealing included implied water rights. Without these rights the Indians would
receive an arid, useless piece of land, lacking the essential resource to make it productive
and habitable. Id. at 574-76.
144. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at 600-01.
145. Id.
146. See text accompanying notes 22-29 supra.
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the treaty Indians' right to fish. Implementation of that right
more than one hundred years after the treaties were signed obvi-
ously presents difficult and controversial issues many of which
the Phase I case left unresolved.
V. PHASE II
In Phase IP47 of the litigation Judge Orrick confronted two
issues the United States Supreme Court had declined to decide.
The State of Washington contended the Indians' allocable share
of fish should not include hatchery fish. 1" 8 Also at issue was
whether the treaty right to fish included an implicit right to
have the fish protected from environmental degradation."49 Both
issues are products or by-products of twentieth century technol-
ogy. Improved fishing industry technology allowed non-treaty
fishermen to significantly deplete the supply of natural fish. At
the same time, increased industrialization in the case area led to
pollution of the fishery habitat.
In some of the most difficult treaty interpretation questions
yet presented, Judge Orrick had to evaluate hundred-year-old
treaty language in light of the complex technology of modern
society. This task was particularly difficult because the treaty
interpretation was not based upon express treaty language but
instead upon a more attenuated implication of treaty rights.
Thus, the court's analysis goes a step beyond equating "in com-
mon with" to mean an equal share. Orrick resolved the issues by
using rules of treaty construction, the purposes and historical
context of the treaties, and legal precedent. His novel resolution
warrants close analysis as a defensible approach to an Indian
treaty rights question.
A. Hatchery Fish
In a holding designed to effectuate both the intent of the
signatory parties and the purposes of the fishing clause, Judge
Orrick ruled that the treaty Indians' allocable share of fish
includes hatchery bred fish. 50 In part, the holding is based upon
147. Phase II, 506 F. Supp. 187 (W.D. Wash. 1980).
148. Id. at 195. The Court uses the terms "hatchery-bred" and "artificially propo-
gated" interchangeably. This Comment uses the term "hatchery fish" to encompass both.
149. Id. at 190.
150. Id. at 197. The hatchery issue is a relatively recent development in this litiga-
tion, apparently the result of the concurring opinion in Puyallup II, where Justice White
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a recognition that hatchery fish are the primary source of avail-
able supply. 15' The crux of the issue is the limited supply of fish
in the case area.152 Of the available fish, there is a mix of hatch-
ery fish and natural fish. " That mix has evolved from predomi-
nantly natural fish to predominantly hatchery fish in most spe-
cies. Hatchery fish constitute a significant portion of the
resource in the case area,'" those released into state waters dur-
ing one recent season, 1978-79, included approximately
371,000,000 salmon and 8,755,000 steelhead.15 5 In contrast, the
percentage of natural fish is declining.' " The marked decrease
of natural fish is partly attributable to the commercialization
and improved technology of the fishing industry and partly
attributable to the general degradation of the fishery habitat. 5 7
If these trends continue, the relative proportion of natural fish
would be minimal and therefore, as a practical matter, to limit
the treaty fishing to natural fish would abrogate the treaty.
Judge Orrick accurately characterized the issue in terms of
protecting the supply of fish in order to protect treaty rights
when he stated the "inescapable conclusion that the exclusion of
hatchery fish jeopardizes Indian treaty fishing rights."' This
characterization reflects the Phase I Court's view that the trea-
ties were designed to guarantee the tribes an adequate supply of
fish.' 9 The only judicially recognized limitations on the treaty
guarantees the Indians' right to harvest the fish "in common
suggested, "the Treaty does not obligate the State of Washington to subsidize the Indian
fishery with planted fish paid for by sports fishermen." 414 U.S. 44, 50 (1973). The char-
acterization of hatchery fish as a "subsidy", however, does not adequately address the
issue.
151. Phase II, 506 F. Supp. at 198.
152. Phase I, 443 U.S. at 668-69; Boldt, 384 F. Supp. at 334, 353.
153. See Phase II, 506 F. Supp. at 198 (quoting affidavit of Jack Ayerst, chief of the
Washington Game Department's Fisheries Management Division).
154. Phase II, 506 F. Supp. at 197. Hatchery fish constitute 60% of the steelhead
and 17% of the salmon in the case area. The Washington Fisheries and Game Depart-
ments have managed hatchery programs since 1895. Each department has steadily
expanded its hatchery operations. When the Phase II opinion was written, the state
operated 19 steelhead trout and 16 salmon hatcheries in the case area. Id. at 196-97.
State-run facilities are funded by state, local, and federal sources. Other hatcheries in
the case area are operated by the United States government, various tribal governments,
and cooperative ventures, some including private parties.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 198.
157. Phase I, 443 U.S. at 668-69. Judge Orrick suggests the state used the hatchery
programs to mitigate this trend. Phase II, 506 F. Supp. at 198.
158. Phase II, 506 F. Supp. at 198-99.
159. Phase I, 443 U.S. at 666.
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with" non-Indians, the Indians' moderate living needs, the
state's conservation powers, and the physical availability of
fish.' 60 These limitations do not explicitly encompass hatchery
fish, and therefore the treaties' general purpose of securing an
adequate supply of fish should prevail. Accordingly, the Phase II
court held that "hatchery fish are 'fish' within the meaning of
the treaties fishing clause."' 6
For further support, Judge Orrick examined the intent of
the treaty signatories.16 2 Relying on the Phase I Court's analysis,
he concluded that regardless of whether the negotiators antici-
pated hatchery-bred fish, the signatories intended that the Indi-
ans continue to fish." Precedent, identifying the right to con-
tinue fishing as the treaties' paramount purpose, buttressed the
intent of the parties.'" These factors support a broad interpre-
tation of treaty language as a means of balancing reserved
Indian treaty rights with the demands of modern society. A
more literal reading would allow non-treaty fishermen to ulti-
mately "crowd the Indians out of any meaningful use of their
accustomed places to fish."' '
The Phase II court was not persuaded that the state had
greater regulatory powers over hatchery fish than over natural
fish. The state argued that because it provides funding for a por-
tion of the hatchery programs, the "necessary for conservation"
standard should not limit its regulatory powers. The court did
not accept this distinction and instead held that the state's
authority to regulate fishing, including both hatchery and
natural fish, "extends no further than the imposition of non-dis-
criminatory, necessary conservation measures."'" The court's
application of the Puyallup H conservation guidelines reiterates
the propriety of consistently applying fundamental standards.
The "necessary for conservation" standard is an important
guideline that ensures a reasonable balance between state and
federal powers. Finally, the state inappropriately used the term
160. Phase II, 506 F. Supp. at 198.
161. Id. at 202.
162. Id. at 199-202.
163. Id. at 198-99. In light of the rules of treaty interpretation, there is a strong
presumption favoring the Indians' subjective intent. See Antoine v. Washington, 420
U.S. 194 (1975). See notes 65-69 supra and accompanying text.
164. Phase II, 506 F. Supp. at 199.
165. Id. at 199, (quoting Phase I, 443 U.S. at 676-77).




"regulate" because it alleged more of an ownership interest and
did not seek to control the time, manner, location, or extent of
hatchery-fish fishing."0 7
The Supremacy Clause requires the state to adhere to the
federal court's allocation pursuant to the treaty.6 8 Accordingly,
state regulations may not impinge upon treaty fishing rights
unless the state establishes that including the hatchery fish in
the Indians' allocable share interferes with conservation. The
Phase II court's hatchery decision, like its environmental
prohibitions, attempts to effectuate the treaty right to continued
fishing by preserving a viable share of the fish resource.
B. Environmental Protection of the Fisheries
Addressing the environmental issues, the court held that:
"implicitly incorporated in the treaties' fishing clause is the right
to have the fishery habitat protected from man-made despolia-
tion."'' Judge Orrick relied on three principal factors: the right
to continue fishing "in perpetuity" 70 was the Indians' funda-
mental reason for signing the treaties, the existence of fish is
fundamental to the exercise of the right,'7 ' and an implied envi-
ronmental right analogous to the implied reservation of water
doctrine. 7  The environmental holding will be controversial
because it is not based upon express treaty language but upon
more attenuated implied treaty rights. 1 8
Judge Orrick identified the existence of fish as "the most
fundamental prerequisite to the right to take fish.' ' 74 This ele-
mentary assumption cuts through several arguments and focuses
on the substance rather than the form of the treaty rights. The
court considered the gradual deterioration of the fishery
167. Phase II, 506 F. Supp. at 201.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 203.
170. Id. See notes 161-64 supra and accompanying text.
171. 506 F. Supp. at 203. See notes 174-81 infra and accompanying text.
172. 506 F. Supp. at 203. See notes 190-99 infra and accompanying text.
173. The decision also established a cause of action to enforce environmental stan-
dards. The Nisqually Indian tribe has sued the cities of Tacoma and Centralia, Nisqually
Indian Tribe v. City of Centralia & City of Tacoma, No. 75-31 (W.D. Wash., amended
complaint filed April 3, 1981), alleging violations of the Phase II standards. The allega-
tions are based upon environmental damage attributed to hydroelectric projects that the
cities built and maintain. The tribe is seeking monetary damages and declaratory and
injunctive relief.
174. 506 F. Supp. at 205.
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resources an unanticipated and destructive encroachment upon
the Indians' right to fish.17 5 Urbanization and extensive settle-
ment of the case area, and rapid development of water power,
logging, irrigation, and general water pollution17 6 have caused so
much environmental damage that, if the trend continues, "the
right to take fish would eventually be reduced to the right to dip
one's net into the water and bring it out empty.1 77
Several landmark decisions support this fish preservation
concept, requiring that neither Indians nor non-Indians unduly
impair the other's fishing rights. According to Orrick, the Phase
I decision reaffirmed the principle that treaty fishing rights are
perpetual.178 It follows that neither the treaty parties nor their
successors in interest may act to destroy the fishery resource.17 9
It is noteworthy that this standard is reciprocal and applies
equally to the Indian tribes and the state. The court cites Con-
federated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation v. Alexan-
der ' as an instance where the potential adverse effects upon
175. See Boldt, 384 F. Supp. at 334, 355-57. Judge Orrick also used this factor to
refute the state's argument that the Indians bargained for both the costs and benefits of
economic development. "To the contrary, it is well established that the treaty negotia-
tors specifically assured the tribes that they could continue to fish notwithstanding the
changes that the impending western expansion would certainly entail." Phase II, 506 F.
Supp. at 204.
Justice Stevens, in Phase I, also reasoned that the Indians reasonably relied on the
representation of the United States negotiators: "Contemporaneous documents make it
clear that these people (Governor Stevens and advisors) recognized the vital importance
of the fisheries to the Indians and wanted to protect them from the risk that non-Indian
settlers might seek to monopolize their fisheries." 443 U.S. at 666 (citing Boldt, 384 F.
Supp. at 329-30).
While negotiating the Treaty of Point Elliot, Governor Stevens made a typical rep-
resentation: "We want to place you in homes where you can cultivate the soil, using
potatoes and other articles of food, and where you will be able to pass in canoes over the
waters of the Sound and catch fish and back to the mountains to get roots and berries."
Id.
176. Phase II, 506 F. Supp. at 203 (quoting UNITED STATES FISH AND WILDLIFE SER-
VICE, WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF FISHERIES AND WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF GAME,
JOINT STATEMENT REGARDING THE BIOLOGY, STATUS, MANAGEMENT, AND HARVEST OF THE
SALMON AND STEELHEAD RESOURCES OF THE PUGET SOUND AND OLYMPIC PENINSULAR
DRAINAGE AREAS OF WESTERN WASHINGTON 20, 78 (1973). These uses represent some of
the most important and powerful industries and interest groups in the case area. An
effective resolution requires an extraordinarily complicated, and inevitably controversial,
balancing of interests and priorities among users.
177. Phase II, 506 F. Supp. at 203.
178. Id.
179. United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d at 685; Boldt, 384 F. Supp. at 401-02;
Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation v. Alexander, 440 F. Supp. 553
(D. Or. 1977). Accord, Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899 (D. Or. 1969).
180. 440 F. Supp. 553 (D. Or. 1977).
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Indian treaty fishing rights barred state actions. That case
involved the construction of a dam that upon completion, would
have eliminated a steelhead run and flooded traditional Indian
fishing stations. The court similarly cites Puyallup III for the
proposition that the state may regulate Indian fishing when the
preservation of the species is at stake. There the Court upheld
state regulation of on-reservation fishing when those regulations
were necessary for conservation.' 81 Preservation of the fishery
resource is therefore the fundamental principle applicable to
both parties.
Precedent supposedly shows that preservation of the spe-
cies, as a reciprocal burden, is a consistent principle applied in
different ways in different cases. Judge Orrick distinguishes the
Phase II case based on the novel correlation between preserva-
tion and environmental protections. 8 2 The problem with this
assertion is that the reciprocal burden in practice applies only to
non-treaty fishermen and the cases cited detail the various
prohibitions which protect treaty fishing.183 In Winans, the
Court held that a non-treaty fish-wheel illegally interfered with
Indian fishing rights." In Puyallup II, the Court prohibited
discriminatory regulations banning Indian net fishing while
allowing hook-and-line sport fishing. 85 Finally, in Boldt the
court struck down state regulations applied discriminatorily
against the Indian treaty fishermen.'"8 Aside from the Puyallup
III decision affirming state regulation of on-reservation
fishing, 8 7 the cases cited are examples of regulation of non-
treaty fishermen. Although the principle of preservation of the
fisheries may underlie the decisions, it is not a "neutral" princi-
ple which is applied reciprocally. The preservation idea, couched
in terms of "reciprocal" and "neutral," implies an equally shared
burden. Precedent, however, indicates that the treaty Indians
have a superior fishing right vis-a-vis non-treaty fishermen, and
it muddles the issue to introduce purported equitable burdens.
A more accurate statement is that the treaty Indians will not be
allowed to harvest fish if the species would be endangered.
181. 433 U.S. at 176-77.
182. Phase II, 506 F. Supp. at 204.
183. See id.
184. See notes 32-35 supra and accompanying text.
185. See notes 48-52 supra and accompanying text.
186. See notes 53-55 supra and accompanying text.
187. 433 U.S. 165 (1977). See notes 56-60 supra and accompanying text.
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The purported neutrality is even less persuasive in light of
the argument that the state has no right to regulate Indian
treaty rights.1 8 8 State police power is the basis for any regulation
of Indian treaty rights, but that power is limited in some
instances by federalism. Moreover, case law has established that
the state police power is explicitly limited if it impinges upon
federal treaty rights.8 9 Despite the reasonableness of preserva-
tion of the species, the court's reliance on the controversial and
unsettled area of state-versus-federal rights weakens the persua-
siveness of the opinion.
The court analogized the fishing rights cases to the
"implied-reservation-of-water" doctrine first articulated in Win-
ters v. United States e" and used in the construction of other
Indian treaties. The basic precept of the doctrine is that when
the federal government reserved or withdrew land for Indian
reservations, national parks, or forests, it also impliedly reserved
sufficient water to fulfill the purpose of the reservation.19 1 Sev-
eral tenets of the doctrine make it a very powerful tool."' The
amount of water reserved includes quantities for future as well
as present needs. The reserved water right cannot be defeated
by general equitable rules of law such as adverse possession,
laches, or estoppel.9e It is not dependent upon any beneficial
use nor is it forfeited by nonuse.'" The right also has a priority
188. See State v. Arthur, 74 Idaho 251, 261 P.2d 135 (1953). If there is no state
power to regulate Indian treaty rights then the principle does not seem neutral because
regulations cut only one way.
189. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
190. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908). The Winters Court first articu-
lated the doctrine. See also United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978); Arizona v.
California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
191. For a comprehensive review of the doctrine and its history see Ranquist, The
Winters Doctrine and How it Grew: Federal Reservation of Right to the Use of Water, 1
B.Y.U.L. REv. 639 (1975).
192. Some say that the Winters doctrine is too powerful a tool. For a discussion of
the implications of Winters on water rights in the western United States see Comment,
Paleface, Redskin, and the Great White Chiefs in Washington. Drawing the Battle
Lines Over Western Water Rights, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 449 (1980). The author sug-
gests that the application of the Winters doctrine has resulted in the Indians wielding
control over a disproportionate share of water. Moreover, she advocates congressional
abrogation of treaty rights as a means of modifying the Winters doctrine to conform
with the states' administration and distribution of water. She tempers this suggestion by
proposing that the treaty rights be limited to the original purposes of the reservation. Id.
at 456.
193. United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation District, 236 F.2d 321, 334 (9th Cir. 1956).
194. Similarly, state action through statute or condemnation cannot affect the right.
See Ranquist, supra note 191, at 655.
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date of the creation of the reservation and is junior only to pri-
vate appropriations dated prior to that creation.
The common element between environmental protections
and the reservation of water is the need to analyze the original
purpose for creating the reservation and to protect that purpose
through implied treaty rights.190 In each instance, a court must
analyze an implied, rather than an express, treaty right. Under-
standably, courts construe implied treaty rights narrowly and an
implied right must be closely related to the original purposes of
the treaty.196 Therefore, a court must make a realistic and defen-
sible determination of why the reservation was created in order
to draw further implications. In Winters, the United States
Supreme Court held that the treaty signatories impliedly
reserved enough water for irrigation when they created an
Indian reservation. The Court reasoned that the purpose of the
reservation was to convert the Indians to a pastoral lifestyle, but
that without water their desert lands would be useless for farm-
ing and the purpose of the treaty would be defeated."9 The
Court explicitly relied on special rules of treaty construction to
resolve ambiguities in the Indians' favor.' The resulting injunc-
tion prohibited the construction of dams, reservoirs, or other
obstructions that "in any manner" prevent the flow of water
through the Milk River adjacent to the Fort Belknap
reservation.199
By analogy to the Winters analysis, in Phase H the purpose
of the treaty was to secure the continued right to fish,200 the
existence of fish is necessary to exercise that right, and the sig-
natories impliedly reserved protection of the fisheries. The bulk
of the Phase II opinion established that the paramount purpose
of the treaties was to secure the right to continue fishing as a
way of life.201 A fundamental prerequisite is the continued exis-
195. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. at 576; accord, Arizona v. California, 373
U.S. 546 (1978).
196. See notes 205-06 infra and accompanying text.
197. 207 U.S. 564 (1908). The reserved water rights doctrine, however, is not con-
fined to Indian treaties but also applies to forest reserves, national parks, and national
monuments. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
198. 207 U.S. at 577.
199. Id. at 576-77.
200. Id. at 564-65.
201. "Virtually every case construing this fishing clause has recognized it to be the
cornerstone of the treaties and has emphasized its overriding importance to the tribes."
Phase II, 506 F. Supp. at 203.
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tence of fish which depends upon an "environmentally accept-
able habitat."202 Consequently, the court concluded it was neces-
sary to imply an environmental standard to fulfill the purposes
of the fishing clause.2 03 Although the analogy seems appropriate,
if somewhat sketchy, the reasoning is not entirely persuasive
because of basic differences between the implied elements, i.e.,
water versus an environmental standard. It is feasible that the
signatories contemplated the use of water to support the reser-
vations whereas the implication of an environmental standard is
considerably more attenuated.
Another potential problem with the analysis is that courts
strictly examine implied water rights claims, 2" some courts con-
sidering the preservation of wildlife an insufficient reason to
imply the right.2 5 The courts generally look to two limiting fac-
tors: the need for water must fulfill the very purpose for which
the reservation was created, and the amount of water reserved
must not exceed the amount necessary to fulfill the purpose of
the reservation.'"
The recognition of implied water rights to preserve fish is
not, however, a unique proposition. In Cappaert v. United
States,'07 the United States Supreme Court held that a Presi-
dential Proclamation declaring Devils Hole a national monu-
ment also reserved an implied water right in appurtenant
waters. Included in the national monument was an underground
pool with a rare species of desert fish expressly identified as war-
ranting "special protection.' 0 8 The Supreme Court reasoned
that preservation of the species was one of the purposes behind
creating the reservation and that the extent of the implied water
right should include an amount necessary to preserve the rare
fish.20 9 Therefore, the adjoining landowners were permanently
enjoined from depleting the water supply below that minimum
amount. Judge Orrick accurately distinguishes the Cappaert
case as a question of "quantity" of water, but reasoned that the
202. Id. at 205.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. "This careful examination is required both because the reservation is implied
rather than expressed. .. ." United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 701 (1978).
206. Id. at 715, 718.
207. 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
208. Id. at 132.
209. Id. at 141.
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same principles apply to the quality of water in this litigation.2 10
On balance, the analogy to implied water rights is persua-
sive because it provides a coherent analytical means of isolating
a treaty right in its historical setting and meaningfully effectuat-
ing that right in the context of modern society. By isolating the
original purpose for creating the reservation, the Court provided
a tangible and consistent link between the original commitments
of the signatory parties and the current factors impacting the
treaty right.
VI. CONCLUSION
This comment attempted to demonstrate a workable
approach to Indian treaty rights issues in the context of the
Pacific Northwest fishing controversy. The authors derived their
approach from two well reasoned federal district court opinions,
Boldt and Phase II. In each case, the court undertook a rigorous
examination of the origin of the treaty rights, the historical con-
text within which the parties negotiated the treaties, and the
importance of fish to the Indian culture, concluding that the
Indians understood the treaties to guarantee a continuing right
to fish. By identifying the Indians' understanding as the central
principle, courts can successfully negotiate the maze of federal
and state court decisions, ambiguous treaty language, statutes,
and historical documents. More importantly, by identifying and
applying consistent principles the courts may establish a coher-
ent analytical framework in a confusing and controversial area of
law.
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